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Abstract
This document contains a bibliographic list of major papers on spec-
trum trading and their abstracts. The aim of the list is to offer researchers
entering this field a fast panorama of the current literature. The list is con-
tinually updated on the webpage http://www.disp.uniroma2.it/users/
naldi/Ricspt.html. Omissions and papers suggested for inclusion may
be pointed out to the authors through e-mail (naldi@disp.uniroma2.it).
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Abstracted Bibliography
• I.F. Akyildiz, W.Y. Lee, M.C. Vuran, and S. Mohanty. Next genera-
tion/dynamic spectrum access/cognitive radio wireless networks: a survey.
Computer Networks, 50(13):2127–2159, 2006
Abstract : Today’s wireless networks are characterized by a fixed spec-
trum assignment policy. However, a large portion of the assigned spectrum
is used sporadically and geographical variations in the utilization of as-
signed spectrum ranges from 15% to 85% with a high variance in time.
The limited available spectrum and the inefficiency in the spectrum usage
necessitate a new communication paradigm to exploit the existing wire-
less spectrum opportunistically. This new networking paradigm is referred
to as NeXt Generation (xG) Networks as well as Dynamic Spectrum Ac-
cess (DSA) and cognitive radio networks. The term xG networks is used
throughout the paper. The novel functionalities and current research chal-
lenges of the xG networks are explained in detail. More specifically, a brief
overview of the cognitive radio technology is provided and the xG network
architecture is introduced. Moreover, the xG network functions such as
spectrum management, spectrum mobility and spectrum sharing are ex-
plained in detail. The influence of these functions on the performance of
the upper layer protocols such as routing and transport are investigated and
open research issues in these areas are also outlined. Finally, the cross-layer
design challenges in xG networks are discussed.
• I.F. Akyildiz, W.-Y. Lee, and K.R. Chowdhury. Spectrum management
in cognitive radio ad hoc networks. IEEE Network, 23(4):6–12, 2009
Abstract : The problem of spectrum scarcity and inefficiency in spec-
trum usage will be addressed by the newly emerging cognitive radio paradigm
that allows radios to opportunistically transmit in the vacant portions of
the spectrum already assigned to licensed users. For this, the ability for
spectrum sensing, spectrum sharing, choosing the best spectrum among
the available options, and dynamically adapting transmission parameters
based on the activity of the licensed spectrum owners must be integrated
within cognitive radio users. Specifically in cognitive radio ad hoc networks,
distributed multihop architecture, node mobility, and spatio-temporal vari-
ance in spectrum availability are some of the key distinguishing factors. In
this article the important features of CRAHNs are presented, along with the
design approaches and research challenges that must be addressed. Spec-
trum management in CRAHNs comprises spectrum sensing, sharing, deci-
sion, and mobility. In this article each of these functions are described in
detail from the viewpoint of multihop infrastructureless networks requiring
cooperation among users.
• J. Bae, E. Beigman, R. Berry, M.L. Honig, H. Shen, R. Vohra, and H. Zhou.
Spectrum markets for wireless services. In 3rd IEEE Symposium on New
Frontiers in Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks DySPAN 2008, pages
1–10, Chicago, 14-17 October 2008
Abstract : It has been widely recognized that the current under-utilization
of spectrum across many bands could be alleviated through the application
of spectrum markets. So far, discussions of market mechanisms for spec-
trum allocations have focused primarily on secondary markets, which are
managed by licensees. Here we explore the consequences of lifting cur-
rent restrictions on allocations and ownership, and allowing more extensive
markets for allocating spectrum across locations, times, and diverse sets
of applications (e.g., broadcast, cellular, broadband data, emergency, etc).
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To motivate our discussion we first estimate the achievable rate per user
that could be provided by sharing a large portion of the spectrum suitable
for cellular and broadcast types of services. Our results suggest that in
general the demand for spectrum may exceed supply implying that market
mechanisms are needed to avoid a tragedy of the commons (i.e., associated
with an alternative commons model). We then discuss a two- tier spectrum
market structure for wireless services in which licenses for spectrum assets
at particular locations are traded as commodities. Spectrum owners can
choose to rent or lease their spectrum assets via spot markets at particular
locations. Such an approach may lower barriers to entry into the wireless
services market thereby facilitating competition and the introduction of
new services.
• Pieter Ballon and Simon Delaere. Flexible spectrum and future business
models for the mobile industry. Telematics and Informatics, 26(3):249–
258, 2009
Abstract : The concept of flexible spectrum is often considered as a
medium-to-long-term solution to overcome some of the current inefficien-
cies and high entry barriers plaguing the mobile industry. Increasingly, a
cognitive pilot channel (CPC) is regarded as a central enabler for flexible
spectrum. This paper outlines the CPC concept from a business point
of view and clarifies its current status in the standardization and regu-
lation fields. The idea of a worldwide CPC will be under consideration
by the World Radio Conference in 2011. Based on several potential CPC
implementations, the paper identifies a number of flexible spectrum busi-
ness configurations and revenue sharing models. It also performs an initial
forward-looking evaluation of these models using a business model score-
card approach, and finds that while the scope appears to be limited for a
fully competitive, cross-operator spectrum market, several platform models
(e.g. association or consortium models) stand out as feasible options.
• E. Bayrak. Welfare effects of spectrum management regimes. In New
Frontiers in Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks, 2008. DySPAN 2008.
3rd IEEE Symposium on, pages 1 –11, 14-17 2008
Abstract : We build a model where consumers have preferences, over
a range of varieties, for communications devices and device qualities. De-
vices use radio spectrum and are produced and sold in a competitive device
market. In such a model, the choice on the spectrum management regime
greatly affects market outcomes and consumer welfare. The choice on the
spectrum management regime effectively determines the final number of
firms in the market and the electromagnetic noise levels firms become sub-
ject to when deciding on the information transmission capabilities of their
devices. We simulate such a model over a wide range of model parame-
ters. We find that the commons regime where the access to and the use of
spectrum is not restricted to license holders creates consumer welfare for
a wider and more reasonable model parameters than the licensing regime
where the access to and the use of spectrum is granted to predetermined
number of licensees.
• C. Bazelon. Licensed or unlicensed: The economic considerations in incre-
mental spectrum allocations. Communications Magazine, IEEE, 47(3):110
–116, march 2009
Abstract : At present, no existing market mechanism allows for the
trading of radio spectrum between licensed and unlicensed uses. When-
ever spectrum is made available for reallocation, the FCC faces a dilemma
in determining which access regime to use. For example, the television
white spaces are largely unused and available for reallocation. Since both
licensed and unlicensed allocations are valuable, allocation decisions (for
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the TV white spaces or any new band of radio spectrum) must be based on
a clear understanding of the trade-offs between the two choices. This ar-
ticle defines economic criteria that can be used in making these important
decisions. Economic criteria can go beyond the simple measures of profit
and consumer surplus from market transactions. Although some measures
of benefit, such as the value of innovation, may be difficult to quantify, the
analytic economic framework presented here can easily incorporate them.
This analysis does not address any noneconomic considerations in choos-
ing between licensed and unlicensed uses. As one example, the issue of
potential societal benefits from promoting minority ownership of spectrum
through restricted licenses - something only possible in a licensed regime -
is not addressed in this economic analysis. The analysis herein provides the
economic information needed for policy analysis; it need not be the sum
total of that policy analysis. Standard economic theory tells us that the
value of an additional unit of spectrum is equal to the increase in socially
beneficial services it produces. For licensed spectrum allowed to trade in
markets, this value is relatively easy to calculate: It is the price firms pay
for the licensed spectrum. The equation is more complex, however, when
unlicensed spectrum is involved. The current value of unlicensed spectrum
bands is equal to the sum of the value of the spectrum in all uses in those
bands. The incremental value of additional spectrum allocated to unli-
censed uses, however, is based - on the relief to congestion the additional
spectrum will provide. Unlicensed spectrum also contains a value associ-
ated with the possibility of future innovation made available by the lower
transaction .costs of gaining access to unlicensed spectrum. This option
value increases with additional allocations of unlicensed spectrum, leading
to the benefit of incremental option value from additional unlicensed spec-
trum. The formula for the benefits from additional unlicensed spectrum
allocations can be summarized as ”congestion alleviation plus incremental
option value.” I apply the analysis developed in this article to the case of
TV white spaces. I use information from the recent auction of the lower 700
MHz band E block to calculate the incremental value of licensing the white
spaces. I also calibrate an estimate of the incremental value of the white
spaces under an unlicensed allocation. Initial calibration of the economic
criteria that determine the trade-off between incremental licensed and un-
licensed spectrum allocations indicates that currently licensing incremental
allocations is the favored policy. If policy makers choose to allocate incre-
mental spectrum as unlicensed, they should recognize the economic costs
of that choice.
• T. Bo¨rgers and C. Dustmann. Awarding telecom licences: the recent Eu-
ropean experience. Economic Policy, 18:215–268, April 2003
Abstract : This paper analyses the procedures used by different Eu-
ropean countries for awarding spectrum licences to potential operators of
third generation (3G) mobile telephone networks. We contrast market-
based methods, such as auctions, with bureaucratic methods, such as ‘beauty
contests’. They have been used for decisions about two major questions:
(1) How many licences should be awarded, and how much spectrum should
each licence give access to?; (2) Which companies should receive which li-
cences, and how much should they pay for their licences? Most countries
used a bureaucratic process to answer the first question. However, Ger-
many, Austria and Greece were different, and constructed auctions in which
the number and size of licences were determined by the auction itself. As
for the second question, there was much variation between countries, and
both auctions, and ‘beauty contests’ were popular methods. We have four
main findings. First, the bureaucratic procedure used by most countries to
answer the first question led to companies concealing relevant information
from the authorities. Second, while firms may have tried to manipulate the
procedures used in Germany, Austria and Greece to deter entry to their
markets, they were surprisingly unsuccessful in this. Third, the traditional
economic criticisms of beauty contests seem to apply to some, but not to
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all those that were conducted. Finally, the bidding strategies adopted by
the telecom companies were often more complex than those predicted by
economic theory
• M. Bykowsky. A secondary market for the trading of spectrum: promoting
market liquidity. Telecommunications Policy, 27(7):533 – 541, 2003
Abstract : The development of a successful secondary market for the
trading of spectrum is not a foregone conclusion. The multi-dimensional
nature of radio spectrum, which requires that a bid to buy and an offer to
sell conform across the multiple dimensions, suggests that the market may
be very “thin.” In addition, existing commercial users of spectrum have
little incentive to sell excess spectrum if such spectrum will be employed
by the buyer to provide a service that competes with the service provider
by the seller. This paper discusses several steps to enhance market liquid-
ity. One approach involves obtaining participation from federal spectrum
users. Another step involves developing a market that both enhances mar-
ket liquidity and provides participants the opportunity to incorporate a call
option in the traded asset.
• M. Bykowsky, M. Olson, and W. Sharkey. Efficiency gains from using a
market approach to spectrum management. Information Economics and
Policy, 22(1):73 – 90, 2010
Abstract : This paper is concerned with the merits of employing market
forces to address the issues of wireless spectrum congestion and the alloca-
tion of spectrum between firms seeking licensed and unlicensed spectrum
rights. We show that when unlicensed spectrum is assigned to all compet-
ing users during periods of excess demand an inefficient outcome related to
the “Tragedy of the Commons” is likely to result. This inefficiency can be
substantially reduced when the assignment of users to unlicensed spectrum
is based on the bandwidth and latency tolerance needs of the competing
users. Further efficiency gains can also occur when users are required to
bid to have their “unlicensed spectrum” needs met in the presence of con-
gestion. The paper also examines the merits of creating an auction based
market in which firms providing spectrum based services to users bid to
have their “spectrum regime” needs satisfied. The objective of this ap-
proach is to reduce the incentive that service operators have to misstate
their expressed value for a given license regime. The efficiency of this ap-
proach is based in large part on the auction mechanism’s ability to solve
a “collective action problem” in which firms desiring unlicensed spectrum
have an incentive to “free-ride” on the bidding behavior of other unlicensed
firms. Together our results open up the possibility that a wide variety of
spectrum policy issues may be efficiently solved using a market-based ap-
proach. They further suggest that there may be a “hybrid” regime that
combines the best features of the license and unlicensed regimes and, thus,
lead to a more efficient use of spectrum at any moment in time.
• C.E. Caicedo and M.B.H. Weiss. Spectrum trading: An analysis of imple-
mentation issues. In New Frontiers in Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks,
2007. DySPAN 2007. 2nd IEEE International Symposium on, pages 579–
584, April 2007
Abstract : The assignment of spectrum licenses through spectrum trad-
ing markets can be used as a mechanism to grant access to spectrum to
those who value it most and can use it more efficiently. Although various
methods for improved spectrum assignment have been proposed along the
lines of Dynamic Spectrum Allocation (DSA) and others, several issues re-
lated to their implementation are still unsolved. Among them, how to deal
with interference in a multi-provider environment and determining the el-
ements and architectures for feasible implementations of spectrum trading
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markets. This paper analyzes several proposed kinds of trading interactions
that may arise in a spectrum trading market and proposes a taxonomy of
architectures that could be used to implement them. We also discuss the
benefits and limitations of using a single or restricted set of wireless stan-
dards in the implementation of a spectrum trading infrastructure as a step
towards Wireless Bandwidth Trading which is proposed as a possible path
for a realizable instance of markets based on spectrum trading concepts.
• Martin Cave. Anti-competitive behaviour in spectrum markets: Analysis
and response. Telecommunications Policy, 34(5-6):251 – 261, 2010
Abstract : The introduction of spectrum trading creates opportunities
for operators, singly or jointly, to foreclose entry into downstream mar-
kets by accumulating unneeded spectrum holdings. After considering how
these issues are treated under administrative methods of spectrum man-
agement, the paper examines the degree of substitutability of frequencies
with or without regulatory constraints, concluding that the latter are a
major source of limitations on substitutability. This may create a case for
intervention in the transition to a spectrum market. Alternative forms of
intervention are considered, including caps on spectrum holdings or on the
acquisition of spectrum at any award
• J.M. Chapin and W.H. Lehr. The path to market success for dynamic
spectrum access technology. IEEE Communications Magazine, 45(5):96–
103, May 2007
Abstract : Rapid progress is being made in the technology for dynamic
spectrum access (DSA) radio systems. However, the structure and dynam-
ics of the wireless service market must also evolve for DSA to succeed.
This article examines the interlinked tecnical and economic issues associ-
ated with markets for DSA-based wireless services. We use this analysis
to make technical and policy recommendations supporting the commercial
success of DSA technology.
• J.M. Chapin and W.H. Lehr. Time-limited leases in radio systems. IEEE
Communications Magazine, 45(6):76–82, June 2007
Abstract : A time-limited lease is a set of rights that expires after a
specified duration. We analyze ways to use leases to facilitate innovation
in radio devices and wireless communication. In our vision, manufacturers
include in their devices a simple, secure subsystem that contains a clock and
disables specific transmit capabilities if no extension message is received by
the end of the lease period. When devices provide this support, regulators
may use certification leases rather than permanent grants to accelerate
deployment of innovative radios. Spectrum rights holders may use leases to
reduce risk in secondary spectrum market transactions. Firms collaborating
in innovative wireless service business models can better retain control of
their respective rights. We examine both the technical and policy issues
associated with leases.
• Choong Ming Chin, S. Olafsson, B. Virginas, and G. Owusu. Trading
strategies in radio spectrum management. In Wireless Pervasive Com-
puting, 2008. ISWPC 2008. 3rd International Symposium on, pages 680
–684, 7-9 2008
Abstract : Radio resource management (RRM) is one of the most chal-
lenging and one of the most important aspects in the provisioning of qual-
ity of service (QoS) for wireless communication systems. With the ever
increasing size of wireless mobile community and its demand for high-
speed multimedia communications, efficient resource management becomes
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a paramount importance due to limited resources available such as spec-
trum and power availability. As radio spectrum is a finite resource, new
approaches are therefore needed to maximize the existing spectrum to en-
sure the wireless userspsila and network providerspsila QoS requirements
are met. In this paper we propose a novel radio spectrum trading via
derivatives contracts as a means to address short-term demands for spec-
trum whilst ensuring end-to-end QoS is met.
• Choong Ming Chin, S. Olafsson, B. Virginas, and G. Owusu. Radio re-
source management via spectrum trading. In Vehicular Technology Con-
ference, 2008. VTC Spring 2008. IEEE, pages 1781 –1785, 11-14 2008
Abstract : The growth in the deployment of wireless systems and tech-
nologies shows that in this rapidly evolving and expanding environment,
radio resource management (RRM) is fast becoming the most significant
aspect in the provisioning of quality of service (QoS) for wireless networks.
As radio spectrum is a finite resource, new approaches are therefore needed
to maximize the existing spectrum to ensure the wireless users’ and net-
work providers’ QoS requirements are met. In this paper we propose a
novel radio spectrum trading via derivatives contracts as a means to ad-
dress short-term demands for spectrum whilst ensuring end-to-end QoS is
met.
• Pietro Crocioni. Is allowing trading enough? making secondary markets
in spectrum work. Telecommun. Policy, 33(8):451–468, 2009
Abstract : The debate on spectrum reforms has mostly focused on the
choice between a property rights and a commons regime. This article argues
that moving to a property right system requires careful attention to details
in order to avoid that ”micro” rather than ”macro” factors may prevent
efficient trades from taking place. It provides a framework to conduct this
assessment, identifies a number of possible concerns and puts forward some
solutions.
• A. Al Daoud, M. Alanyali, and D. Starobinski. Secondary pricing of spec-
trum in cellular cdma networks. In New Frontiers in Dynamic Spectrum
Access Networks, 2007. DySPAN 2007. 2nd IEEE International Sympo-
sium on, pages 535 –542, 17-20 2007
Abstract : We study secondary pricing of spectrum in wireless cellular
networks employing CDMA at the physical layer. We consider a primary
license holder who aims to lease its spectrum within a certain geographic
subregion of its own network. Such a transaction has two contrasting eco-
nomic implications for the seller: On the one hand the seller obtains a
revenue due to the exercised price, or rent, of the region. On the other
hand, the seller incurs a cost due to (i) reduced spatial coverage of its net-
work and (ii) possible interference from the leased region into the retained
portion of its network. We formulate an optimization problem with the
objective of profit maximization, and characterize its solutions based on a
reduced load approximation that can be shown to be asymptotically ex-
act. The form of optimal prices suggests charging the buyer per admitted
call, in proportion with the interference it generates. The charged amount
balances the corresponding loss of revenue incurred by the seller due to
the influence of an admitted call. We numerically argue that this pricing
approach yields better profit compared to some other simplistic techniques.
• A. Al Daoud, M. Alanyali, and D. Starobinski. On pricing of spectrum in
secondary markets. In Information Theory and Applications Workshop,
2007, pages 11 –15, jan. 2007
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Abstract : Optimal price of spectrum in secondary markets is studied.
We consider a primary license holder who aims to lease the right to provide
service in a given subset of its coverage area. Such a transaction has two
contrasting economic implications for the seller: on the one hand the seller
obtains a revenue due to the exercised price of the region. On the other
hand, the seller incurs a cost due to (i) reduced spatial coverage of its net-
work and (ii) possible interference from the leased region into the retained
portion of its network. We formulate an optimization problem with the
objective of profit maximization, and characterize its solutions based on a
reduced load approximation. The form of optimal price suggests charging
each admitted call in proportion to the attendant revenue loss due to the
generated interference.
• A. Al Daoud, M. Alanyali, and D. Starobinski. Pricing strategies for spec-
trum lease in secondary markets. Networking, IEEE/ACM Transactions
on, 18(2):462 –475, april 2010
Abstract : We develop analytical models to characterize pricing of spec-
trum rights in cellular CDMA networks. Specifically, we consider a primary
license holder that aims to lease its spectrum within a certain geographic
subregion of its network. Such a transaction has two contrasting economic
implications: On the one hand the lessor obtains a revenue due to the ex-
ercised price of the region. On the other hand, it incurs a cost due to:
(1) reduced spatial coverage of its network; and (2) possible interference
from the leased region into the retained portion of its network, leading
to increased call blocking. We formulate this tradeoff as an optimization
problem, with the objective of profit maximization. We consider a range
of pricing philosophies and derive near-optimal solutions that are based
on a reduced load approximation (RLA) for estimating blocking probabil-
ities. The form of these prices suggests charging the lessee in proportion
to the fraction of admitted calls. We also exploit the special structure of
the solutions to devise an efficient iterative procedure for computing prices.
We present numerical results that demonstrate superiority of the proposed
strategy over several alternative strategies. The results emphasize impor-
tance of effective pricing strategies in bringing secondary markets to full
realization.
• Ashraf Al Daoud, Murat Alanyali, and David Starobinski. Pricing spec-
trum access in cellular cdma networks with heterogeneous demand. In
Broadband Communications, Networks and Systems, 2007. BROADNETS
2007. Fourth International Conference on, pages 469 –475, 10-14 2007
Abstract : We consider pricing secondary access to wireless spectrum in
cellular CDMA networks. We study the case for a primary license holder
interested in leasing the right of providing service in a given geographical
region of its coverage network. The goal is to price access to the cells
in that region under heterogeneous call traffic demand with the objective
of profit maximization. While a revenue is gained from the leased region
due to the exercised price, the primary license holder incurs a loss due
to reduced spatial coverage of the network and also due to interference
effect from the leased into the retained region. We exploit the spatial effect
of interference due to geographical locations of the cells and set a price
per cell rather than pricing the whole region by a scalar quantity. We
employ reduced load approximations which have proved useful in classical
telephony and characterize optimal prices for different pricing philosophies,
e.g., flat pricing and demand-based pricing. The obtained formula of prices
suggests charging per admitted call in proportion with the interference that
the call generates. The charged amount balances the corresponding loss of
revenue due to the influence of an admitted call. We present an iterative
price computing technique and provide a numerical study in support of our
analytical results.
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• A.S. De Vany, R.D. Eckert, C.J. Meyers, D.J. O’Hara, and R.C. Scott. A
property system for market allocation of the electromagnetic spectrum:
A legal-economic-engineering study. Stanford Law Review, 21:1499–1561,
June 1969
• A. De Vany. Implementing a market–based spectrum policy. Journal of
Law & Economics, 41:627–646, 1998
Abstract : The spectrum auctions were a step toward the Herzel?Coase
vision of a flexible and efficient market for spectrum. This article examines
what remains to be done. Spectrum must be unbundled from broadcast and
transmission facilities. The “commoditization” of spectrum will facilitate
standardization, price discovery, and open access to diverse users. A liquid
secondary spectrum market will lower transactions and entry cost, making
telecommunications markets contestable. Auctions should be used to elicit
a supply of spectrum from licensees as well as to allocate it to new users. In
closing the spectrum commons, Congress granted use to a privileged few.
Unbundled spectrum property rights, commoditization, and open markets
will give the public access to this public resource.
• L. Doyle and T. Forde. Towards a fluid spectrum market for exclusive
usage rights. In 2nd IEEE Symposium on New Frontiers in Dynamic
Spectrum Access Networks DySPAN 2007, pages 620–632, Dublin, 17-20
April 2007
Abstract : This paper focuses on highly fluid markets for trading exclu-
sive spectrum usage-rights. The purpose of the paper is to underline the
need for flexible usage-rights policies, as a core facilitator of such markets
as well as to stress the need for a greater technical input to the debate.
The paper builds on current work in the field of spectrum property rights
and exclusive usage-rights. The first half of the paper captures the current
state-of-play and presents a framework for visualizing the concepts involved.
The paper goes on to make a clear distinction between the defining of a set
of exclusive usage-rights and the exercising of those rights. This leads to a
discussion of policies that are not alone about defining metrics and setting
their desired values but are also about behaviors that involve negotiation
and interaction. Through-out the paper the evolution of technology and
its affect on the progress towards the goal of fluid spectrum markets is em-
phasized, as is the need for a very multifaceted approach to the challenges
involved.
• L. Duan, J. Huang, and B. Shou. Competition with dynamic spectrum
leasing. IEEE DySPAN, April 2010
Abstract : Dynamic spectrum leasing can greatly enhance the spectrum
efficiency and encourage more flexible services in the spectrum market.
This paper presents a comprehensive study of the interactions of two com-
petitive secondary network operators who need to make optimal investment
and pricing decisions with heterogeneous investment costs and users’ wire-
less characteris- tics. The two operators need to determine their optimal
spectrum leasing amounts from the spectrum owners, and compete to sell
the spectrum to secondary users. The asymmetric leasing costs and the
heterogeneity of users’ channel conditions and transmission powers make
the analysis quite challenging. We model the interactions between the op-
erators and the users as a three-stage dynamic game. We show that when
the leasing costs are small for both operators, there are infinitely many
investment (leasing) equilibria. When the two costs are high and compa-
rable, there exists a unique investment equilibrium where both operators
lease positive amounts. When the costs are high and very different, the
operator with the smaller cost will dominate the market as a monopolist.
We also show that a meaningful pricing equilibrium exists only when total
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bandwidth investment of the operators is no larger than a threshold. Each
user receives a fair resource allocation that only depends on the leasing
costs of the operators and is independent of other users’ wireless charac-
teristics. We also compare the competitive equilibria with the case where
the two operators cooperate to maximize the total profit. We show that
the Price of Anarchy for the total profit is 75competition is no larger than
25% in the worst case. We also show that the users always benefit from
competition in terms of their payoffs.
• M.C. Farquhar and A.Q. Fitzgerald. Legal and regulatory issues regarding
spectrum rights trading. Telecommunications Policy, 27:527–532, August
2003
Abstract : The FCC’s historic “command-and-control” approach to spec-
trum management has contributed to spectrum scarcity, especially as it
relates to spectrum below 3 GHz. This approach has also made it diffi-
cult for spectrum users to adjust their business plans to the needs of the
marketplace. A more flexible regulatory regime would increase spectrum
efficiency and foster innovation and new services. In order to promote more
flexible use of spectrum, the authors recommend a number of regulatory and
statutory changes, including (1) the elimination of use restrictions for new
wireless allocations; (2) the replacement of existing use restrictions with
power limits sufficient to minimize the potential for harmful interference;
(3) the enactment of rules expressly allowing private parties to “contract
around” established interference limits; and (4) the identification of “safe
harbor” spectrum leasing arrangements that are deemed permissible under
the FCC’s license transfer of control requirements. The authors also recom-
mend a number of statutory reforms, including granting the FCC express
statutory authority to auction spectrum licenses held by private parties and
assess spectrum fees upon users of auction-exempt spectrum.
• B. Freyens. A policy spectrum for spectrum economics. Information Eco-
nomics and Policy, 21(2):128–144, 2009
Abstract : Recent reforms to radio spectrum regulation have sparked
controversy over the respective merits of two mutually exclusive liberal-
ization regimes: property rights and commons. This debate is restrictive
because it is largely incomplete and misunderstood. It is also costly in
terms of opposition and delays to reforms. Goals of efficient spectrum allo-
cation are better served by a wider policy toolkit, inclusive of hybrid and
intermediary regimes. In this article I sketch the contours of a ‘spectrum
of spectrum regimes’, triangulating regulatory, private ownership and unli-
censed approaches. I illustrate this triangulated model, which I then apply
to confront allocative decisions in digital dividend policy, such as the FCC’s
open access clause in the 700 MHz auction and Ofcom’s current review of
UHF spectrum release in the 800 MHz band.
• S. Gandhi, C. Buragohain, L. Cao, H. Zheng, and S. Suri. Towards real-
time dynamic spectrum auctions. Computer Networks, 52(4):879–897,
2008
Abstract : In this paper, we propose a low-complexity auction frame-
work to distribute spectrum in real-time among a large number of wire-
less users with dynamic traffic. Our design consists of a compact and
highly expressive bidding format, two pricing models to control tradeoffs be-
tween revenue and fairness, and fast auction clearing algorithms to achieve
conflict-free spectrum allocations that maximize auction revenue. We de-
velop analytical bounds on algorithm performance and complexity to verify
the efficiency of the proposed approach. We also use both simulated and
real deployment traces to evaluate the auction framework. We conclude
that pricing models and bidding behaviors have significant impact on auc-
tion outcomes and spectrum utilization. Any efficient spectrum auction
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system must consider demand and spectrum availability in local regions to
maximize system-wide revenue and spectrum utilization.
• W. Glover and M. Nekovee. Dynamic Spectrum: Going the full circle.
In 2nd IEEE Symposium on New Frontiers in Dynamic Spectrum Access
Networks (DySPAN 2007), Dublin, April 2007
Abstract : Recent technological progress has brought new life to the
notion of ”just-in-time” spectrum management, raising the concern that
further development is being held back by archaic regulatory restrictions
imposed by spectrum managers. In the search for a solution, it has become
clear that several interdisciplinary challenges still undermine the concepts
of Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) and Dynamic Spectrum Management
(DSM). In this paper we take a step back from the technical detail of
implementation and focus on identifying the key milestones to the success
of DSM. In identifying a roadmap for DSM, we look at the history of
spectrum regulation, charting the key events in the transformation from
free and open spectrum into the tightly regulated system of ”Command
& Control” that exists today. We outline the similarities between DSM
and open spectrum and build on these to present the timeline for spectrum
management in terms of a spectrum spiral. We expand on this roadmap,
breaking down the key drivers and barriers at each milestone. We conclude
that without spectrum scarcity, the concept of DSM is meaningless. But,
given that prime spectrum is thought to be scarce, the key remaining barrier
to the success of DSM is that of commercial viability.
• Jianwei Huang, Randall Berry, and Michael L. Honig. Auction-based spec-
trum sharing. MONET, 11(3):405–408, 2006
Abstract : We study auction mechanisms for sharing spectrum among
a group of users, subject to a constraint on the interference temperature at
a measurement point. The users access the channel using spread spectrum
signaling and so interfere with each other. Each user receives a utility
that is a function of the received signal-to-interference plus noise ratio. We
propose two auction mechanisms for allocating the received power. The first
is an auction in which users are charged for received SINR, which, when
combined with logarithmic utilities, leads to a weighted max-min fair SINR
allocation. The second is an auction in which users are charged for power,
which maximizes the total utility when the bandwidth is large enough and
the receivers are co-located. Both auction mechanisms are shown to be
socially optimal for a limiting “large system” with co-located receivers,
where bandwidth, power and the number of users are increased in fixed
proportion. We also formulate an iterative and distributed bid updating
algorithm, and specify conditions under which this algorithm converges
globally to the Nash equilibrium of the auction.
• Lingjie Duan, Jianwei Huang, and Biying Shou. Competition with dy-
namic spectrum leasing. CoRR, abs/1003.5517, 2010
Abstract : This paper presents a comprehensive analytical study of two
competitive cognitive operators’ spectrum leasing and pricing strategies,
taking into account operators’ heterogeneity in leasing costs and users’
heterogeneity in transmission power and channel conditions. We model the
interactions between operators and users as a three-stage dynamic game,
where operators make simultaneous spectrum leasing and pricing decisions
in Stages I and II, and users make purchase decisions in Stage III. Us-
ing backward induction, we are able to completely characterize the game’s
equilibria. We show that both operators make the equilibrium leasing and
pricing decisions based on simple threshold policies. Moreover, two oper-
ators always choose the same equilibrium price despite their difference in
leasing costs. Each user receives the same signal-to-noise-ratio (SNR) at
the equilibrium, and the obtained payoff is linear in its transmission power
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and channel gain. We also compare the duopoly equilibrium with the coor-
dinated case where two operators cooperate to maximize their total profit.
We show that the maximum loss of total profit due to operators’ com-
petition is no larger than 25%. The users, however, always benefit from
operators’ competition in terms of their payoffs. We show that most of
these insights are robust in the general SNR regime.
• O. Ileri, D. Samardzija, and N.B. Mandayam. Demand responsive pricing
and competitive spectrum allocation via a spectrum server. In New Fron-
tiers in Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks, 2005. DySPAN 2005. 2005
First IEEE International Symposium on, pages 194 –202, 8-11 2005
Abstract : In this paper we develop a framework for competition of fu-
ture operators likely to operate in a mixed commons/property-rights regime
under the regulation of a spectrum policy server (SPS). The operators dy-
namically compete for customers as well as portions of available spectrum.
The operators are charged by the SPS for the amount of bandwidth they
use in their services. Through demand responsive pricing, the operators try
to come up with convincing service offers for the customers, while trying to
maximize their profits. We first consider a single-user system as an illus-
trative example. We formulate the competition between the operators as a
non-cooperative game and propose an SPS-based iterative bidding scheme
that results in a Nash equilibrium of the game. Numerical results suggest
that, competition increases the user’s (customer’s) acceptance probability
of the offered service, while reducing the profits achieved by the operators.
It is also observed that as the cost of unit bandwidth increases relative
to the cost of unit infrastructure (fixed cost), the operator with superior
technology (higher fixed cost) becomes more competitive. We then extend
the framework to a multiuser setting where the operators are competing
for a number of users at once. We propose an SPS-based bandwidth al-
location scheme in which the SPS optimally allocates bandwidth portions
for each user-operator session to maximize its overall expected revenue re-
sulting from the operator payments. Comparison of the performance of
this scheme to one in which the bandwidth is equally shared between the
user-operator pairs reveals that such an SPS-based scheme improves the
user acceptance probabilities and the bandwidth utilization in multiuser
systems
• O. Ileri, D. Samardzija, and N.B. Mandayam. Dynamic property rights
spectrum access: Flexible ownership based spectrum management. In New
Frontiers in Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks, 2007. DySPAN 2007.
2nd IEEE International Symposium on, pages 254 –265, 17-20 2007
Abstract : In this paper we develop a framework for operator competi-
tion based on short term ownership of spectrum resources and devise a dy-
namic spectrum access method called ”Dynamic Property Rights Spectrum
Access (D-Pass)”. In the D-Pass model, spectrum portions are allocated to
operators on a short term basis (few sessions) by a SPS (Spectrum Policy
Server) that serves as a controller/enforcer as well as a clearinghouse for
spectrum allocations. Prior to each short term allocation, the SPS opti-
mally determines a specific partition of spectrum resources among the op-
erators to maximize a system related objective function. The operators are
charged by the SPS for the amount of spectrum they are allocated. Given
the spectrum allocation, the operators compete with each other for users
present in the system through demand responsive pricing, in the form of an
iterative bidding scheme reminiscent of simultaneous ascending auctions.
At every iteration, the operators make rate and price offers for each user
considering the bandwidth allocated to them and their costs associated
with serving the users. The users respond by declaring the probabilities
with which they will accept the service offers made. We consider two dif-
ferent objective functions for the SPS to maximize while determining the
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exact partition of the spectrum resources: (1) the total expected bandwidth
utilization, (2) the minimum acceptance probability that a user accepts the
offered service. We demonstrate several tradeoffs between these objectives
through numerical experiments and illustrate the effect of bandwidth cost
on these tradeoffs. Our results also suggest that employing short term allo-
cation of resources could potentially lead to performance gains as opposed
to static allocation of resources, especially in regimes where the bandwidth
is relatively expensive.
• O. lleri and N.B. Mandayam. Dynamic spectrum access models: toward
an engineering perspective in the spectrum debate. Communications Mag-
azine, IEEE, 46(1):153 –160, january 2008
Abstract : Until recently, the proponents of spectrum commons and
the proponents of spectrum property rights had settled, like the armies of
the Marne, into their entrenched positions, emerging only to launch pe-
riodic and unproductive attacks across a semantic and philosophical no
man’s land. Recently, however, there have been calls to move beyond these
entrenched positions, by developing pragmatic models and solutions that
capture some of the benefits of each philosophical position. In this article
we cautiously enter that no man’s land with two illustrative dynamic spec-
trum access models. While both of our models retain a bias toward usage of
spectrum resources based on a spectrum property rights approach, they also
promote dynamic access and short-term dedication of spectrum resources.
We call these models dynamic property rights spectrum access (D-Pass)
and dynamic commons property rights spectrum access (D-CPass). In this
work we focus primarily on engineering issues, proposing the use of a spec-
trum policy server as a clearinghouse and specifying the spectrum access
mechanisms relevant to each model. To demonstrate the useful studies
enabled through these models, we present illustrative results via the band-
width utilization achieved under each model. Our results indicate that both
the spectrum access mechanism and market forces will play important roles
in determining the resulting bandwidth utilization.
• S.K. Jayaweera and Tianming Li. Dynamic spectrum leasing in cognitive
radio networks via primary-secondary user power control games. Wireless
Communications, IEEE Transactions on, 8(6):3300 –3310, june 2009
Abstract : Hierarchical dynamic spectrum access (DSA) has received
the most attention in recent years as the solution for better spectrum uti-
lization. In this paper, on the other hand, we develop a framework for
dynamic spectrum leasing (DSL). Power control in hierarchical DSA net-
works only involves that of controlling secondary user transmissions. Thus,
in game theoretic formulations of power control in cognitive DSA networks
only secondary users are considered as players of the game. In proposed
dynamic spectrum leasing, on the other hand, the primary users are re-
warded for allowing secondary users to operate in their licensed spectrum.
Thus, in the proposed DSL networks the primary users have an incen-
tive to allow secondary users to access the spectrum whenever possible to
the maximum extent. We develop a game theoretic framework for such
dynamic spectrum leasing in which primary users actively participate in
a non-cooperative game with secondary users by selecting an interference
cap on the total interference they willing to tolerate. We establish that the
proposed primary-secondary user power control game has a unique Nash
equilibrium. Performance of a DSL system based on the proposed game
model is compared through simulations under different linear receivers at
the secondary base station.
• Youngsun Kwon, Jungsub Lee, and Youngkyun Oh. Economic and pol-
icy implications of spectrum license fee payment methods. Telecommun.
Policy, 34(3):175–184, 2010
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Abstract : This paper argues that ”Do auctions raise consumer prices?”
is a misleading question. License fee payment methods, rather than spec-
trum assignment methods, are key factors that bring forth different market
outcomes in the wireless telecommunication industry. This paper analyzes
and discusses the effects of three spectrum license fee payment methods-
upfront lump-sum fees, royalties, and profit sharing-on economic efficiency,
spectrum supply, and government revenue. Royalties create distortions in
product and factor markets but can induce the government to increase
spectrum supply and encourage firms’ investments. A caveat is that the
analyses are based on the model assuming monopoly market and informa-
tion certainty.
• Thomas M. Lenard, Lawrence J. White, and James L. Riso. Increasing
Spectrum for Broadband: What are the Options? SSRN eLibrary, 2010
Abstract : The growth of wireless broadband is a bright spot in the
U.S. economy, but a shortage of flexibly licensed spectrum rights could put
a crimp on this expansion. Freeing up spectrum from other uses would allow
greater expansion of wireless broadband and would bring substantial gains -
likely in the hundreds of billions of dollars - for U.S. consumers, businesses,
and the federal treasury. In this paper we suggest three methods of making
more spectrum available for market-based allocation, from both public and
private sources.
• X.-Y. Li, P. Xu, S. Tang, and X. Chu. Spectrum bidding in wireless
networks and related. In COCOON ’08: Proceedings of the 14th annual
international conference on Computing and Combinatorics, pages 558–
567, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2008. Springer-Verlag
Abstract : In this paper, we study the spectrum assignment problem for
wireless access networks. Opportunistic spectrum usage is a promising tech-
nology. However, it could suffer from the selfish behavior of secondary users.
In order to improve opportunistic spectrum usage, we propose to combine
the game theory with wireless modeling. Several versions of problems are
formalized under different assumptions. We design PTAS or efficient ap-
proximation algorithms for each of these problems such that overall social
benefit is maximized. Finally, we show how to design a truthful mechanism
based on all these algorithms.
• E. Lichtenberger. Spectrum trading in Germany, Austria and the UK: The
influence of regulatory regimes and evaluation of criteria on competition
in the European mobile telecommunication sector. In ITS Conference,
Helsinki, August 2003
Abstract : Spectrum is one of the most important and valuable assets of
mobile telecommunications operators. According to the options provided
in the European Directives, national legislative bodies are in the process
of defining the regulatory framework for spectrum trading. While the de-
tails of the individual regulations in the various member states may differ,
spectrum trading will, in any case, confront operators with a new challenge
encompassing potential competition, complexity, risks and opportunities.
In Germany, a first draft of the new law has been presented for public dis-
cussion. In Austria, after a discussion process last year, the new law was
supposed to be enacted before the summer of 2003. In the United King-
dom, a draft communication bill is subject to broad and intense discussion.
Despite the fact that all concepts are based on the European framework,
when analysed in detail, the differences among the various countries are
significant. This paper describes three national concepts, thereby showing
the range of possibilities and considers the competition law criteria that
national regulatory authorities (NRA) might utilise when deciding whether
to approve individual transactions.
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• L. Mastroeni and M. Naldi. A real options model for the transferability
value of telecommunications licenses. Annals of Telecommunications, 65(3-
4):201–210, April 2010
Abstract : Licenses for telecommunications services are awarded with a
number of side obligations and commitments for the licensee. Under such
obligations the licensee is typically not allowed to transfer its license to
another operator. Such prohibition may cause heavy inconveniences for
customers, so that its removal is strongly advocated and already a reality
in many cases. Its removal adds value to the original license and may
then constitute a valuable option (the transferability option). A method is
here proposed to assess such value, by using the framework of real options.
The method is applied in a variety of settings and shows that the value
of the option depends superlinearly on the reselling price and the market
volatility, and linearly or sub-linearly on the expiry time of the option.
• L. Mastroeni and M. Naldi. Option-based dynamic management of wireless
spectrum. In NGI’09: Proceedings of the 5th Euro-NGI conference on
Next Generation Internet networks, pages 55–62, Aveiro, Portugal, 1-3
July 2009. IEEE Press
Abstract : Dynamic spectrum management makes it possible for the
owner of usage rights on some frequency blocks to sublet each of them in
real time and for a limited period of time. As a softer implementation with
respect to the spot market a two stage assignment is here proposed through
the use of options, which give buyers the right to purchase the usage right
on a single block and for a timeslot. In the sale of options the primary
owner may accomplish an overbooking strategy, which consists in selling
more blocks than the available ones and acts as hedging against the risk of
unsold blocks. A model for the overbooking strategy is described and eval-
uated, which takes into account both the value of the option, the correlated
decisions taken by the prospective purchasers, and the penalty to be paid to
the unsatisfied customers. The dependence of the economical convenience
of the overbooking strategy on the relevant parameters (among which the
penalty value and the overbooking factor) is shown for a significant range
of cases.
• L. Mastroeni and M. Naldi. Spectrum reservation options for mobile vir-
tual network operators. In NGI’10: Proceedings of the 6th Euro-NGI con-
ference on Next Generation Internet networks, Paris, France, 2-4 June
2010. IEEE Press
Abstract : Mobile Virtual Network Operators (MVNO) operate without
owning spectrum usage rights, by leasing spectrum from Mobile Network
Operators owning a license. Spectrum leasing may occur through a reser-
vation process that assigns the MVNO the right, but not the obligation, to
lease spectrum at a later time. Reservation contracts may be signed with
strict guarantees, that provide MVNOs with the certainty of obtaining
the needed spectrum, or soft guarantees, which allow the MNO to adopt
an overbooking policy and refusing to lease the spectrum, compensating
the refused MVNO through the payment of a penalty. In this paper the
two kinds of reservation contracts are compared from the viewpoint of the
MVNO, by considering the profitability of the two alternatives. The cash
flows associated to the two kinds of reservation contracts are determined
and employed to compare the alternatives. The probability of overbooking
and the expiry time of reservations appear as the major decision factors,
while the penalty value has a negligible influence. It is shown that the reser-
vation contract with soft guarantees is to be prefereed for larger values of
the expiry time and for the lower values of the overbooking probability.
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• L. Mastroeni and M. Naldi. Pricing of reservations for time-limited spec-
trum leases under overbooking. In 9th Conference of Telecommunication,
Media and Internet Techno-Economics CTTE 2010, Ghent, Belgium, 7-9
June 2010. IEEE Press
Abstract : With spectrum trading the owners of usage rights on wire-
less spectrum may transfer them temporarily to other users. A secondary
market for spectrum may be implemented through the use of reservation
mechanisms, by which prospective consumers of spectrum portions may
first book them and decide later whether to actually buy the usage rights.
A possible strategy for the owners of usage rights is to practise overbooking,
i.e., to allow for more reservations than what they could sell (and then pay
a penalty if they cannot satisfy the requests). A relevant problem for the
owners of usage rights is to set the price for reservations. An algorithm is
proposed here to price reservations in the presence of overbooking. The al-
gorithm is based on the iterative use of the Cox-Ross-Rubinstein approach
to price financial call options. The algorithm is then applied to a number
of cases and the dependence of the price on the overbooking probability
and the penalty is analysed.
• J.W. Mayo and S. Wallsten. Enabling efficient wireless communications:
The role of secondary spectrum markets. Information Economics and
Policy, 22(1):61 – 72, 2010
Abstract : Despite the potentially critical nature of secondary markets
in maintaining efficient spectrum and wireless markets, research has to date
has focused primarily on the Federal Communication Commission’s rules
for initial distribution of spectrum. To redress this lacuna, we first examine
the evolution of conceptual and policy developments directed toward sec-
ondary spectrummarkets. Then, we seek to move beyond those efforts to
empirically document the development of secondary spectrum activity in
the United States and the relationship of that development to the evolving
policy toward such markets. We categorize and explore different types of
secondary spectrum markets. Then, by drawing on a database of every
spectrum license transaction since 1994, we explore the depth and breadth
of spectrum trading in secondary markets. We find that the FCC has radi-
cally reduced the time it takes to approve trades, making the system more
akin to notification than to approval. We also find that a large amount of
spectrum changes hands each year. While these conclusions do not nec-
essarily imply that secondary markets work efficiently, they do show that
policy efforts to facilitate and energize the growth of secondary spectrum-
markets are bearing considerable fruit.
• A.-H. Mohsenian-Rad, V.W.S. Wong, and V.C.M. Leung. Two-fold pricing
to guarantee individual profits and maximum social welfare in multi-hop
wireless access networks. Wireless Communications, IEEE Transactions
on, 8(8):4110 –4121, august 2009
Abstract : In a multi-hop wireless access network, where each node
is an independent self-interested commercial entity, pricing is helpful not
only to encourage collaboration but also to utilize the network resources
efficiently. In this paper, we propose a market-based model with two-fold
pricing (TFP) for wireless access networks. In our model, the relay-pricing
is used to encourage nodes to forward packets for other nodes. Each node
receives a payment for the relay service that it provides. We also consider
interference-pricing to leverage optimal resource allocation. Together, the
relay and interference prices incorporate both cooperative and competitive
interactions among the nodes. We prove that TFP guarantees positive
profit for each individual wireless node for a wide range of pricing func-
tions. The profit increases as the node forwards more packets. Thus, the
cooperative nodes are well rewarded. We then determine the relay and
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interference pricing functions such that the network social welfare and the
aggregate network utility are maximized. Simulation results show that,
compared to two recently proposed single-fold pricing models, where only
the relay or only the interference prices are considered, our proposed TFP
scheme significantly increases the total network profit as well as the ag-
gregate network throughput. TFP also leads to more fair revenue sharing
among the wireless relay nodes.
• H. Mutlu, M. Alanyali, and D. Starobinski. Spot pricing of secondary
spectrum access in wireless cellular networks. Networking, IEEE/ACM
Transactions on, 17(6):1794–1804, Dec. 2009
Abstract : Recent deregulation initiatives enable cellular providers to
sell excess spectrum for secondary usage. In this paper, we investigate the
problem of optimal spot pricing of spectrum by a provider in the presence
of both nonelastic primary users, with long-term commitments, and oppor-
tunistic, elastic secondary users. We first show that optimal pricing can be
formulated as an infinite horizon average reward problem and solved using
stochastic dynamic programming. Next, we investigate the design of effi-
cient single pricing policies. We provide numerical and analytical evidences
that static pricing policies do not perform well in such settings (in sharp
contrast to settings where all the users are elastic). On the other hand, we
prove that deterministic threshold pricing achieves optimal profit amongst
all single-price policies and performs close to global optimal pricing. We
characterize the profit regions of different pricing policies, as a function of
the arrival rate of primary users. Under certain reasonable assumptions on
the demand function, we prove that the profit region of threshold pricing is
optimal and independent of the specific form of the demand function, and
that it includes the profit region of static pricing. In addition, we show that
the profit function of threshold pricing is unimodal in price. We determine
a restricted interval in which the optimal threshold lies. These properties
enable very efficient computation of the optimal threshold policy, which is
far faster than that of the global optimal policy.
• M.J. Neely. Optimal pricing in a free market wireless network. In INFO-
COM 2007. 26th IEEE International Conference on Computer Commu-
nications. IEEE, pages 213 –221, 6-12 2007
Abstract : We consider an ad-hoc wireless network operating within
a free market economic model. Users send data over a choice of paths,
and scheduling and routing decisions are updated dynamically based on
time varying channel conditions, user mobility, and current network prices
charged by intermediate nodes. Each node sets its own price for relaying
services, with the goal of earning revenue that exceeds its time average
reception and transmission expenses. We first develop a greedy pricing
strategy that maximizes social welfare while ensuring all participants make
non-negative profit. We then construct a (non-greedy) policy that balances
profits more evenly by optimizing a profit fairness metric. Both algorithms
operate in a distributed manner and do not require knowledge of traffic
rates or channel statistics. This work demonstrates that individuals can
benefit from carrying wireless devices even if they are not interested in
their own personal communication.
• Dusit Niyato, Ekram Hossain, and Zhu Han. Dynamics of multiple-seller
and multiple-buyer spectrum trading in cognitive radio networks: A game-
theoretic modeling approach. IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing,
8(8):1009–1022, 2009
Abstract : We consider the problem of spectrum trading with multiple
licensed users (i.e., primary users) selling spectrum opportunities to multi-
ple unlicensed users (i.e., secondary users). The secondary users can adapt
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the spectrum buying behavior (i.e., evolve) by observing the variations in
price and quality of spectrum offered by the different primary users or
primary service providers. The primary users or primary service providers
can adjust their behavior in selling the spectrum opportunities to secondary
users to achieve the highest utility. In this paper, we model the evolution
and the dynamic behavior of secondary users using the theory of evolution-
ary game. An algorithm for the implementation of the evolution process of
a secondary user is also presented. To model the competition among the
primary users, a noncooperative game is formulated where the Nash equi-
librium is considered as the solution (in terms of size of offered spectrum to
the secondary users and spectrum price). For a primary user, an iterative
algorithm for strategy adaptation to achieve the solution is presented. The
proposed game-theoretic framework for modeling the interactions among
multiple primary users (or service providers) and multiple secondary users
is used to investigate network dynamics under different system parameter
settings and under system perturbation.
• Dusit Niyato and Ekram Hossain. A microeconomic model for hierarchical
bandwidth sharing in dynamic spectrum access networks. Computers,
IEEE Transactions on, 59(7):865 –877, july 2010
Abstract : We consider the problem of hierarchical bandwidth shar-
ing in dynamic spectrum access (or cognitive radio) environment. In the
system model under consideration, licensed service (i.e., primary service)
can share/sell its available bandwidth to an unlicensed service (i.e., sec-
ondary service), and again, this unlicensed service can share/sell its allo-
cated bandwidth to other services (i.e., tertiary and quaternary services).
We formulate the problem of hierarchical bandwidth sharing as an inter-
related market model used in microeconomics for which a multiple-level
market is established among the primary, secondary, tertiary, and quater-
nary services. We use the concept of demand and supply functions to obtain
the equilibrium at which all the services are satisfied with the amount of
allocated bandwidth and the price. These demand and supply functions are
derived based on the utility of the connections using the different services
(i.e., primary, secondary, tertiary, and quaternary services). For distributed
implementation of the hierarchical bandwidth sharing model in a system in
which global information is not available, iterative algorithms are proposed
through which each service adapts its strategies to reach the equilibrium.
The system stability condition is analyzed for these algorithms. Finally,
we demonstrate the application of the proposed model to achieve dynamic
bandwidth sharing in an integrated WiFi-WiMAX network.
• D. Niyato and E. Hossain. Competitive spectrum sharing in cognitive
radio networks: a dynamic game approach. Wireless Communications,
IEEE Transactions on, 7(7):2651 –2660, july 2008
Abstract : ”Cognitive radio” is an emerging technique to improve the
utilization of radio frequency spectrum in wireless networks. In this pa-
per, we consider the problem of spectrum sharing among a primary user
and multiple secondary users. We formulate this problem as an oligopoly
market competition and use a noncooperative game to obtain the spectrum
allocation for secondary users. Nash equilibrium is considered as the solu-
tion of this game. We first present the formulation of a static game for the
case where all secondary users have the current information of the adopted
strategies and the payoff of each other. However, this assumption may not
be realistic in some cognitive radio systems. Therefore, we consider the
case of bounded rationality in which the secondary users gradually and
iteratively adjust their strategies based on the observations on their previ-
ous strategies. The speed of adjustment of the strategies is controlled by
the learning rate. The stability condition of the dynamic behavior for this
spectrum sharing scheme is investigated. The numerical results reveal the
dynamics of distributed dynamic adaptation of spectrum sharing strategies.
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• D. Niyato, E. Hossain, and Zhu Han. Dynamic spectrum access in ieee
802.22- based cognitive wireless networks: a game theoretic model for com-
petitive spectrum bidding and pricing. Wireless Communications, IEEE,
16(2):16 –23, april 2009
Abstract : The emerging IEEE 802.22-based wireless regional area net-
work technology will use the same radio spectrum currently allocated for
TV service. This standard will use the concept of cognitive radio based on
dynamic spectrum access to provide wireless access services in a large cover-
age area. A brief overview of the current state of the IEEE 802.22 standard
is provided with a particular emphasis on the spectrum management (i.e.,
spectrum sensing and dynamic spectrum access) in this standard. Key re-
search issues related to spectrum trading among TV broadcasters, WRAN
service providers, and IEEE 802.22-based cognitive radio users are identi-
fied. To this end, a hierarchical spectrum trading model is presented to
analyze the interaction among WRAN service providers, TV broadcasters,
and WRAN users. In this model a double auction is established among
multiple TV broadcasters and WRAN service providers who sell and buy
the radio spectrum (i.e., TV bands), respectively. Again, multiple WRAN
service providers compete with each other by adjusting the service price
charged to WRAN users. We propose a joint spectrum bidding and service
pricing model for WRAN service providers to maximize their profits. A
non-cooperative game is formulated to obtain the solution in terms of the
number of TV bands and the service price of a service provider. Numerical
results are presented on the performance of this joint spectrum bidding and
pricing model.
• D. Niyato and E. Hossain. Spectrum trading in cognitive radio networks:
A market-equilibrium-based approach. Wireless Communications, IEEE,
15(6):71 –80, december 2008
Abstract : Cognitive radio has emerged as a new design paradigm for
the next-generation wireless networks. Cognitive radio networks are de-
signed based on the concept of dynamic spectrum sharing where cognitive
radio users can opportunistically share the radio spectrum. For exam-
ple, in case of vertical spectrum sharing, a spectrum owner (or primary
user/service) can share (or sell) its licensed spectrum with (to) other users
(i.e., secondary users/services). The economics of spectrum sharing, which
is referred to as spectrum trading, is the focus of this article. The objective
of spectrum trading is to maximize the revenue of the spectrum owner,
and at the same time enhance the satisfaction of the cognitive radio users.
We first discuss the different network architectures and protocol behav-
iors for dynamic spectrum sharing as well as the spectrum sharing models.
Then the scope of spectrum trading is discussed in the context of different
spectrum sharing models. The primary research issues related to spectrum
trading in cognitive radio networks are outlined, and the possible solution
approaches are discussed. To this end, we introduce a market-equilibrium-
based spectrum trading mechanism that uses spectrum demand and supply
of the primary and secondary users, respectively. Since spectrum supply is
stochastic in nature, a distributed and adaptive learning algorithm is used
for the secondary users to estimate spectrum price and adjust the spectrum
demand accordingly so that the market equilibrium can be reached.
• S. Olafsson, B. Glover, and M. Nekovee. Future management of spectrum.
BT Technology Journal, 25(2):52–63, 2007
Abstract : As the heterogeneity of wireless access technologies increases,
dynamic allocation and utilisation of spectrum become ever more impor-
tant. The traditional rigid allocation of spectrum for technology-specific
usage is not suitable for the increasingly dynamic demand driven by the
continuous emergence of technologies providing new services with differ-
ent quality of service requirements. New spectrum management techniques
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and increasingly flexible spectrum usage rights are therefore called for. We
discuss the limitations of present spectrum management techniques and ex-
plore some new alternatives including spectrum trading and opportunistic
spectrum access.
• J.M. Peha. Spectrum management policy options. Communications Sur-
veys Tutorials, IEEE, 1(1):2 –8, first 1998
Abstract : As market-based reform sweeps telecommunications indus-
tries around the world, it is a good time to reevaluate the spectrum man-
agement policies which govern wireless industries ranging from broadcast
television to satellite communications. Most countries have been using a
central planning approach to spectrum management, but there are many
alternatives with varying degrees of flexibility and market-based incentives.
This paper provides a survey of spectrum management approaches, address-
ing methods of determining how spectrum can be used, which commercial
entities can use it, and how governments can manage their own spectrum.
It identifies some of the crucial choices to be made, and summarizes advan-
tages and disadvantages of each.
• J.M. Peha. Approaches to spectrum sharing. Communications Magazine,
IEEE, 43(2):10 –12, feb. 2005
Abstract : Many complain about severe spectrum shortage. The short-
age comes from outdated spectrum policies that allows for little sharing.
Regulators have granted licenses that offer exclusive access to the spec-
trum. When these licensees are not transmitting, the spectrum sits idle. A
new technology regarding spectrum shortage enables more spectrum shar-
ing that unleashes innovative products and services, provided that we adopt
the appropriate spectrum policies. Two camps are pushing for extreme re-
form, one for ”property rights” and the other for ”spectrum commons”.
This article presents concepts underlying the ”property” and ”commons”
debate, clarifies options for spectrum reform, and describes the trade-offs
of spectrum sharing.
• J.M. Peha. Sharing spectrum through spectrum policy reform and cogni-
tive radio. Proceedings of the IEEE, 97(4):708 –719, april 2009
Abstract : Traditionally, interference protection is guaranteed through a
policy of spectrum licensing, whereby wireless systems get exclusive access
to spectrum. This is an effective way to prevent interference, but it leads
to highly inefficient use of spectrum. Cognitive radio along with software
radio, spectrum sensors, mesh networks, and other emerging technologies
can facilitate new forms of spectrum sharing that greatly improve spectral
efficiency and alleviate scarcity, if policies are in place that support these
forms of sharing. On the other hand, new technology that is inconsistent
with spectrum policy will have little impact. This paper discusses policies
that can enable or facilitate use of many spectrum-sharing arrangements,
where the arrangements are categorized as being based on coexistence or
cooperation and as sharing among equals or primary-secondary sharing. A
shared spectrum band may be managed directly by the regulator, or this re-
sponsibility may be delegated in large part to a license-holder. The type of
sharing arrangement and the entity that manages it have a great impact on
which technical approaches are viable and effective. The most efficient and
cost-effective form of spectrum sharing will depend on the type of systems
involved, where systems under current consideration are as diverse as tele-
vision broadcasters, cellular carriers, public safety systems, point-to-point
links, and personal and local-area networks. In addition, while cognitive
radio offers policy-makers the opportunity to improve spectral efficiency,
cognitive radio also provides new challenges for policy enforcement. A re-
sponsible regulator will not allow a device into the marketplace that might
harm other systems. Thus, designers must seek innovative ways to assure
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regulators that new devices will comply with policy requirements and will
not cause harmful interference.
• G. Pogorel. Radio Spectrum Policy and Management: A Turning Point?
Communications & Strategies, pages 109–117, 1st quarter 2003
• S. Sengupta and M. Chatterjee. An economic framework for dynamic
spectrum access and service pricing. Networking, IEEE/ACM Transac-
tions on, 17(4):1200 –1213, aug. 2009
Abstract : The concept of dynamic spectrum access will allow the radio
spectrum to be traded in a market like scenario allowing wireless service
providers (WSPs) to lease chunks of spectrum on a short-term basis. Such
market mechanisms will lead to competition among WSPs where they not
only compete to acquire spectrum but also attract and retain users. Cur-
rently, there is little understanding on how such a dynamic trading system
will operate so as to make the system feasible under economic terms. In
this paper, we propose an economic framework that can be used to guide i)
the dynamic spectrum allocation process and ii) the service pricing mech-
anisms that the providers can use. We propose a knapsack based auction
model that dynamically allocates spectrum to the WSPs such that revenue
and spectrum usage are maximized. We borrow techniques from game the-
ory to capture the conflict of interest between WSPs and end users. A
dynamic pricing strategy for the providers is also proposed. We show that
even in a greedy and non-cooperative behavioral game model, it is in the
best interest of the WSPs to adhere to a price and channel threshold which
is a direct consequence of price equilibrium. Through simulation results, we
show that the proposed auction model entices WSPs to participate in the
auction, makes optimal use of the spectrum, and avoids collusion among
WSPs. We demonstrate how pricing can be used as an effective tool for
providing incentives to the WSPs to upgrade their network resources and
offer better services.
• J.A. Stine. Enabling secondary spectrum markets using ad hoc and mesh
networking protocols. Journal of Communications, 1(1):26–37, 2006
Abstract : Spectrum management is the process of deciding how ra-
dio frequency (RF) spectrum may be used in a geographical region and
who may use it. Traditionally, spectrum management has been executed
as an administrative and political process with the intent of making last-
ing decisions. Its lack of responsiveness and resolution causes much spec-
trum to lay fallow since most users rarely need spectrum continuously and
ubiquitously. In this paper, we propose an alternative spectrum manage-
ment approach that enables management at a greater temporal and spatial
resolution using networks and wireless ad hoc and mesh networking tech-
nologies. Three different spectrum management ideas are described. The
Synchronous Collision Resolution (SCR) MAC protocol enables a strict
arbitration of spectrum access based on spectrum rights thus enabling a
hierarchy of networks in the same spectrum that always guarantees the
primary rights holder precedence. Second, it autonomously manages the
use of an arbitrary number of channels in the same network. The third and
most exciting idea is a new fast command and control model for spectrum
management. An underlying ad hoc network built using the Nodes State
Routing* (NSR) protocol is used to track and manage the use of spectrum
of attached RF emitters. NSR tracks the state of the network by collecting
and disseminating the states of the nodes. These states can include relevant
information on the spectrum these nodes are using and are observing oth-
ers use. Thus the network supports tracking and monitoring spectrum use
spatially in near real time. Spectrum management utilities built on top of
the network could allow users and spectrum managers to rapidly negotiate
the use of spectrum and assist spectrum managers in identifying unused
21
spectrum and emitters causing harmful interference. We conclude with
proposed standardization and regulatory changes to make this feasible.
• U. Stumpf and L. Nett. The economics of frequency trading. In ITS
European Regional Conference, 22-24 August 2003
• La´szlo´ Toka and Attila Vida´cs. General distributed economic framework
for dynamic spectrum allocation. Computer Communications, 32(18):1955
– 1964, 2009. Cognitive Radio and Dynamic Spectrum Sharing Systems
Abstract : The emergence of novel radio techniques enables the applica-
tion of advantageous revolutionary spectrum policies. An important body
of research has appeared about possible frequency management schemes,
but none of them proposes solutions that meet every related criteria. In this
paper we present our work on dynamic spectrum allocation and pricing that
offers a distributed mechanism design, well-suited to practical employment
issues. Our model handles interference effects without any restricting as-
sumptions, provides universal scalable and incentive-compatible allocation
and pricing mechanisms. We provide both analytical and numerical evalu-
ation of the proposed framework, and in either case we prove this latter to
be a suitable approach to efficient and flexible spectrum utilization.
• T.M. Valletti. Spectrum Trading. Telecommunications Policy, 30:655–670,
October 2001
Abstract : This paper argues that the current centralised model of spec-
trum management is highly inefficient and should be replaced with decen-
tralised solutions. The current model suppresses competitive entry, blocks
efficient spectrum use, and insulates old technologies from innovative chal-
lenge. In the new system, the default rule should endow operators with the
highest flexibility, leaving the regulator to monitor the proper working of
competition rather than deciding who does what.
• X. Wang, Z. Li, P. Xu, Y. Xu, X. Gao, and H.-H. Chen. Spectrum sharing
in cognitive radio networks: An auction-based approach. Systems, Man,
and Cybernetics, Part B: Cybernetics, IEEE Transactions on, 40(3):587
–596, june 2010
Abstract : Cognitive radio is emerging as a promising technique to im-
prove the utilization of the radio frequency spectrum. In this paper, we
consider the problem of spectrum sharing among primary (or ”licensed”)
users (PUs) and secondary (or ”unlicensed”) users (SUs). We formulate the
problem based on bandwidth auction, in which each SU makes a bid for the
amount of spectrum and each PU may assign the spectrum among the SUs
by itself according to the information from the SUs without degrading its
own performance. We show that the auction is a noncooperative game and
that Nash equilibrium (NE) can be its solution. We first consider a single-
PU network to investigate the existence and uniqueness of the NE and
further discuss the fairness among the SUs under given conditions. Then,
we present a dynamic updating algorithm in which each SU achieves NE in
a distributed manner. The stability condition of the dynamic behavior for
this spectrum-sharing scheme is studied. The discussion is generalized to
the case in which there are multiple PUs in the network, where the prop-
erties of the NE are shown under appropriate conditions. Simulations were
used to evaluate the system performance and verify the effectiveness of the
proposed algorithm.
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• D. Willkomm, S. Machiraju, J. Bolot, and A. Wolisz. Primary user be-
havior in cellular networks and implications for dynamic spectrum access.
Communications Magazine, IEEE, 47(3):88–95, March 2009
Abstract : Dynamic spectrum access approaches, which propose to op-
portunistically use underutilized portions of licensed wireless spectrum such
as cellular bands, are increasingly being seen as a way to alleviate spectrum
scarcity. However, before DSA approaches can be enabled, it is important
that we understand the dynamics of spectrum usage in licensed bands. Our
focus in this article is the cellular band. Using a unique dataset collected
inside a cellular network operator, we analyze the usage in cellular bands
and discuss the implications of our results on enabling DSA in these bands.
One of the key aspects of our dataset is its scale-it consists of data collected
over three weeks at hundreds of base stations. We dissect this data along
different dimensions to characterize if and when spectrum is available, de-
velop models of primary usage, and understand the implications of these
results on DSA techniques such as sensing.
• Yongle Wu, Beibei Wang, K.J.R. Liu, and T.C. Clancy. A scalable collusion-
resistant multi-winner cognitive spectrum auction game. Communications,
IEEE Transactions on, 57(12):3805 –3816, december 2009
Abstract : Dynamic spectrum access (DSA), enabled by cognitive ra-
dio technologies, has become a promising approach to improve efficiency
in spectrum utilization, and the spectrum auction is one important DSA
approach, in which secondary users lease some unused bands from primary
users. However, spectrum auctions are different from existing auctions
studied by economists, because spectrum resources are interference-limited
rather than quantity-limited, and it is possible to award one band to mul-
tiple secondary users with negligible mutual interference. To accommodate
this special feature in wireless communications, in this paper, we present
a novel multi-winner spectrum auction game not existing in auction litera-
ture. As secondary users may be selfish in nature and tend to be dishonest
in pursuit of higher profits, we develop effective mechanisms to suppress
their dishonest/collusive behaviors when secondary users distort their valu-
ations about spectrum resources and interference relationships. Moreover,
in order to make the proposed game scalable when the size of problem
grows, the semi-definite programming (SDP) relaxation is applied to re-
duce the complexity significantly. Finally, simulation results are presented
to evaluate the proposed auction mechanisms, and demonstrate the com-
plexity reduction as well.
• P. Xavier and D. Ypsilanti. Policy issues in spectrum trading. Info - The
journal of policy, regulation and strategy for telecommunications, 8:34–
61(28), 1 March 2006
Abstract : Purpose - An aspect of spectrum reform receiving increasing
attention is the introduction of secondary markets for spectrum in order to
enable more flexibility to reassign unused and underused spectrum to users
that will use it more efficiently. This paper proposes to focus on the policy
issues relating to the development of well-functioning secondary markets
for spectrum.
Design/methodology/approach - The paper reviews developments in
the debate over secondary markets for spectrum. It draws together key
elements from the academic literature, various government and government-
commissioned reports, and the practical experience of the few countries that
have already introduced spectrum trading. There is considerable focus
on concerns and potential costs relating to the introduction of spectrum
trading and liberalisation. This has a constructive aim - to draw attention
to the need to address such concerns in order to facilitate the development
of spectrum trading.
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Findings - While there is a persuasive case for spectrum trading, countries
have been slow to introduce it because of a number of concerns. This paper
identifies these concerns and the regulatory framework/policies needed to
address them.
Originality/value - The paper distils the policy issues in the debate over
spectrum trading and identifies the role that regulators will need to play
in the introduction, facilitation and regulation of secondary markets for
spectrum.
• Yiping Xing, R. Chandramouli, and C. Cordeiro. Price dynamics in com-
petitive agile spectrum access markets. Selected Areas in Communications,
IEEE Journal on, 25(3):613 –621, april 2007
Abstract : We explore the price dynamics in a competitive market con-
sisting of spectrum agile network service providers and users. Here, multi-
ple self interested spectrum providers operating with different technologies
and costs compete for potential customers. Different buyers or consumers
may evaluate the same seller differently depending on their applications,
operating technologies and locations. Two different buyer populations, the
quality-sensitive and the price-sensitive are investigated, and the result-
ing collective price dynamics are studied using a combination of analysis
and simulations. Various scenarios are considered regarding the nature and
accuracy of information available to the sellers. A myopically optimal strat-
egy is studied when full information is available, while a stochastic learning
based strategy is considered when the information is limited. Cooperating
groups may be formed among the sellers which will in-turn influence the
group profit for those participants. Free riding phenomenon is observed
under certain circumstances.
• Hui Yu, Lin Gao, Yun Li, Xiaoying Gan, Xinbing Wang, Youyun Xu,
Wen Chen, and A.V. Vasilakos. Information sharing in spectrum auction
for dynamic spectrum access. In Global Telecommunications Conference,
2009. GLOBECOM 2009. IEEE, pages 1 –5, nov. 2009
Abstract : Spectrum under-utilization is one of the bottlenecks of the de-
velopment of wireless communication, and dynamic spectrum access (DSA)
is envisioned as a novel mechanism to solve the problem of spectrum scarcity.
Spectrum auction has been recognized as an effective way to achieve DSA,
wherein the primary spectrum owner (PO) acts as an auctioneer who has
free channels and is willing to sell them for additional revenue, and the
secondary user (SU) acts as a bidder who is willing to buy a channel from
POs for its service. In this paper, we adopt a progressive spectrum auction
named MAP, which has been proved optimal and incentive compatible in
DSA networks with distributed POs and SUs. However, in MAP, the profit
of POs is not maximized under the equilibrium point due to the scarcity of
SUs’ private information known by POs. We propose an information shar-
ing mechanism, in which the POs exchange their local information with
each other. We show analytically that, allowing information sharing, each
PO is able to learn the private information of SUs and increase its profit
accordingly. Long term profit acts as the incentive for information sharing
that all the POs automatically reveal the true information when they are
aware of this. It is notable that information sharing doesn’t affect social
optimality. Simulation shows the increase of POs’ profits in the sense of
long term interests.
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